The Resource A veto players' game? : comparing and explaining domestic coordination regarding the European Union in Germany and Denmark, Mads Christian Dagnis Jensen

A veto players' game? : comparing and explaining domestic coordination regarding the European Union in Germany and Denmark, Mads Christian Dagnis Jensen

Label
A veto players' game? : comparing and explaining domestic coordination regarding the European Union in Germany and Denmark
Title
A veto players' game?
Title remainder
comparing and explaining domestic coordination regarding the European Union in Germany and Denmark
Statement of responsibility
Mads Christian Dagnis Jensen
Creator
Contributor
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
What are the key determinants behind how member states develop positions for the negotiations in the Council of the European Union? This is the major question that this thesis seeks to answer. In order to develop negotiation positions for the Council, all member states have established an EU coordination system which can be defined as a structure containing interlinked units whose function is to align national EU-related activities so that a national negotiation position can be presented in negotiations in the EU decision making system. A number of studies have investigated EU coordination systems and their determinants. By and large, existing studies find that EU coordination systems vary to a large extent because they are a function of pre-existing institutions and values characterising the political systems of each member state. However, these studies are not calibrated to single out exactly which national institutions matter most and many of them neglect national agency. In order to address this shortfall and advance our knowledge about EU coordination, a number of predictions are generated using the veto player approach. The predictions are assessed against empirical evidence from Germany and Denmark, which varies considerably in terms of the constellation of veto players. The two coordination systems are outlined, using process tracing, from three perspectives. First, a diachronic perspective is taken to analyse how coordination systems were established and have changed over time. This analysis shows that veto players play a prominent role in shaping coordination systems, as they utilise their veto powers to increase their influence when determining national negotiation positions. Second, a synchronic perspective is used to examine how coordination systems are organised at a specific point in time. The veto player approach performs well in explaining cross-country variation in the role of subnational units and national parliaments. Third, an applied perspective is used to analyse how EU coordination systems work de facto when establishing national negotiation positions for the draft Services Directive. This analysis indicates that veto players are important but there is not a straightforward correlation between their number and the effectiveness of the coordination systems
Member of
Cataloging source
IT-FiEUI
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Dagnis Jensen, Mads Christian
Date time place
Defence date: 20 December 2011
Dissertation note
Thesis (Ph. D.)--European University Institute (SPS), 2011.
Index
no index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
theses
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
European University Institute
Series statement
  • EUI PhD theses
  • EUI theses
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • European Union
  • European Union
Label
A veto players' game? : comparing and explaining domestic coordination regarding the European Union in Germany and Denmark, Mads Christian Dagnis Jensen
Instantiates
Publication
Note
  • Examining Board: Professor Dr. Adrienne Héritier, European University Institute (Supervisor) ; Professor Dr. Tanja Börzel, Freie Universität Berlin ; Professor Dr. Peter Nedergaard, University of Copenhagen ; Professor Dr. Pascal Vennesson, European University Institute
  • Key words: EU coordination, core executive, Europeanisation, Council of Ministers, veto player, rational choice institutionalism, institutional change
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 242-265)
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier.
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent.
Control code
FIEb17017245
Dimensions
30 cm.
Extent
xv, 274 pages
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia.
Media type code
n
Other physical details
illustrations
System control number
(OCoLC)1088447505
Label
A veto players' game? : comparing and explaining domestic coordination regarding the European Union in Germany and Denmark, Mads Christian Dagnis Jensen
Publication
Note
  • Examining Board: Professor Dr. Adrienne Héritier, European University Institute (Supervisor) ; Professor Dr. Tanja Börzel, Freie Universität Berlin ; Professor Dr. Peter Nedergaard, University of Copenhagen ; Professor Dr. Pascal Vennesson, European University Institute
  • Key words: EU coordination, core executive, Europeanisation, Council of Ministers, veto player, rational choice institutionalism, institutional change
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 242-265)
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier.
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent.
Control code
FIEb17017245
Dimensions
30 cm.
Extent
xv, 274 pages
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia.
Media type code
n
Other physical details
illustrations
System control number
(OCoLC)1088447505

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